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III.
INTRODUCTION
This
coverage.

appeal

results

from

a

dispute

over

insurance

The appellant, Kirk H. Mower, a self-employed truck

driver, is appealing two summary judgments.

The first summary

judgment dismissed his claims against Lynn Transportation Company,
Inc. ("Lynn11 or "Lynn Transportation") and Alexander & Alexander,
Inc.

("A&A")

for

failure

Compensation Insurance.

to

procure

and

provide

The lower court dismissed Mower's breach

of contract, negligence, negligent misrepresentation
claims.

Worker's

and fraud

The second summary judgment awarded Lynn Transportation

$34,398.52 in attorney's fees and costs as a result of the lower
court's interpretation of a contractual indemnification provision.
In his opening brief, Mower identified ten (10) issues on
appeal.

The issues focus on (1) whether there is an integrated

contract, or whether

issues of fact must be resolved prior to

determining the integration issue (Issues 1, 2 and 10); (2) whether
the lower court correctly applied the parol evidence rule (Issues
3 and 4 ) ; (3) whether equitable estoppel requires reversal of the
summary judgment

(Issues 5 and 9 ) ; (4) contract

interpretation

(Issues 6 and 8 ) ; and (5) statutory construction (Issue 7 ) .
In his opening brief, Mower showed that the first summary
judgment must be reversed because there are issues of material fact
1

that must be resolved before a court can conclude that the written
agreement,
contract.

absent

the

insurance

order

form,

(Appellants1 brief, pp. 19-22.)

is an

integrated

Mower also showed that

the court misapplied the parol evidence rule because the rule does
not

bar

claims

based

upon

negligence

or

misrepresentation.

Further, the rule cannot bar claims against a defendant that is not
a party to the integrated contract.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 24-

27) .
Mower also explained that there are material issues of
fact which must be resolved before the court can determine whether
Lynn Transportation is estopped from denying its promise to obtain
worker's

compensation

insurance

for

Mower

and

whether

Lynn

Transportation is estopped from seeking attorney's fees under its
form

agreement.

addition,

Mower

(Appellant's
showed

brief,

that

the

pp.

28-29,

Mower/Lynn

35-38).

In

Transportation

indemnification clause, when strictly construed, does not apply and
the summary judgment awarding attorney's fees must be vacated.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 33-34).
Finally, Mower showed that Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43(3) (a)
an Industrial Commission notice provision is no defense to Mower's
claims and does not justify the lower court's summary judgment.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 30-31).
In its responding brief, appellee, Lynn Transportation,
2

Inc. argues that Mower did not contest the

issue of

integration

says there

in the

lower

court.

Lynn

also

contract
is no

material fact issue requiring resolution prior to the lower court's
conclusion that the Mower/Lynn agreement, absent the
application, was an integrated contract.

insurance

(Lynn's brief, pp. 10-

12.)
From the foregoing conclusory argument, Lynn says that
the

parol

evidence

rule

bars

evidence

that

the

Lynn-provided

insurance order form and the statements of Lynn's employees that
Lynn would obtain worker's compensation insurance for Mower, were
a part of the contract.

(Lynn's brief, pp 13-14.)

In addition,

Lynn says that estoppel is unavailable to Mower as a matter of law,
because Mower could not have reasonably relied on Lynn's statements
and actions.

Lynn also argues that the promises made by Lynn's

employees are not sufficiently definite and certain.

Moreover,

Lynn says that Mower was not without fault so equitable estoppel is
inapplicable.

(Lynn's brief, pp. 15-24.)

Lynn Transportation also argues that Mower can only sue
in contract, not tort.

It says "the agreement controls and Mower's

remedies are limited to rights evidenced by the contract" (Lynn's
brief, p.25).

In making its argument, Lynn characterizes Mower's

damages as "purely economic, rather than direct damages for his
physical injuries."

(Lynn's brief, at 27).
3

In addition, Lynn argues that, because Mower did not
notify

the

Industrial

Commission

that

he wanted

the

Worker's

Compensation Act to apply to him, Mower could not have obtained
benefits,

even

if Lynn had

(Lynnfs brief, pp. 29-33).
this

case

results

out

of

procured

the

insurance

for Mower.

Finally, Lynn argues that the injury in
the

performance

of

the

Mower/Lynn

agreement, so the Utah court properly entered summary judgment in
favor of Lynn on the contract indemnification clause.

(Lynn's

brief, pp. 34-36).
Appellee, A&A also filed a responding brief.
brief, A&A says the summary judgment entered
correct because Mower

In its

in its favor was

failed to present evidence of breach of

contract, negligence, fraud or misrepresentation by A&A.
brief, p. 10) .

(A&A's

More specifically, A&A says that the insurance

order form did not create a contract to procure insurance because
allegedly Mower did not present any evidence of mutual consent.
(A&Afs brief, pp. 11-12).

A&A also argues that Mower failed to

show that A&A had a duty to procure the worker's

compensation

insurance.
In addition, A&A argues that it had no contract with
Mower, and A&A was not a party to the Mower/Lynn agreement, so it
cannot be held liable under any misrepresentation theory.

A&A

protests that it did not make any affirmative representation, false
4

or otherwise, to Mower,

(A&A's brief, pp. 17-19).

Moreover, A&A

argues that estoppel cannot apply to this case because A&A was not
a party to the agreement.

A&A also contends that Mower

"can

forward no evidence that he relied on any representation, act or
omission of A&A."

(A&Afs brief, p. 21).

Finally, A&A says that § 31A-1-43 bars Mower's claims
because in this case, contrary to the facts in Garrett v. Garrett.
249 S.E.2d 808 (N.C. App. 1978), A&A did not recover any premiums
or other benefit whereby estoppel could be justified.

In their

briefs, both appellees also improperly attempt to set forth the
facts and inferences supported by the record in the light most
favorable to them, rather than in a light favorable to the party
opposing

summary

judgment.

This reply

brief

responds

to the

arguments raised by both Lynn Transportation and A&A and their
improper recitation of the facts.
IV.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
WHETHER THE MOWER/LYNN FORM CONTRACT WAS
AN INTEGRATED CONTRACT OR WHETHER THE FORM
CONTRACT SHOULD BE CONSTRUED TOGETHER WITH THE
LYNN PROVIDED INSURANCE FORM AND/OR THE CONTEMPORANEOUS
STATEMENTS OF LYNN f S EMPLOYEES, WAS AN ISSUE RAISED
BY THE PARTIES AND CONSIDERED IN THE LOWER COURT.
A.

Appellees f Briefs:
Lynn Transportation says that Mower raised no argument
5

and

pointed

to

no

fact

concerning

the

written

agreement's

integration, so this court should not consider Mower's argument
that the first summary judgment should be reversed because issues
of fact exist regarding the contract's integration.

(Lynn's brief,

p. 10).
B.

Discussion:
It is simply not true that "Mower raised no argument and

pointed to no fact, concerning the written agreement's integration"
as alleged at p. 10 of Lynn's brief.

The fact Mower agreed by

contract to obtain insurance does not preclude his claim that he
satisfied this duty by ordering insurance through defendants. Both
parties raised and contested the contract integration issue.

In

defendants' joint Motion for Summary Judgment on the plaintiff's
claim, Lynn and A&A argued that the issues in this case, should be
dealt with using traditional notions of the parol evidence rule and
the function of integration clauses within contracts. (R. 395) .
Subsequently, Mower responded in his "Memorandum in Response to
Defendant's Joint Motion for Summary Judgment" that as part of the
hiring process, Lynn provided the insurance order form together
with the contract and that Lynn's employees told him that "he could
obtain all necessary

insurance through Lynn Transportation and

Alexander & Alexander."

Mower explained that both his contract

with

insurance

Lynn

and

the

6

order

form

were

signed

contemporaneously as part of one transaction wherein Mower became
employed

as an independent contractor

for Lynn.

(R.

465-68).

Subsequently in his memo, Mower argued that disputed facts which
preclude summary judgment in his case include, "the effect of the
order form."

(R. 475),

If there was any question that the issue

of integration was contested, and there is not, that question was
resolved in paragraph 2 of the Order granting Summary Judgment.
2.
The Court determines that the contract
between Lynn Transportation and plaintiff
Mower* . . is an integrated contract.
(R.
566) .
In summary, all parties raised the contract integration
issue and the court ruled on the issue.

That is all that is

required to preserve the integration issue for appeal. See e.g.
LaBaron Associates v. Rebel Enterprises, 823 P.2d 479, 482 (Utah
App.

1991).

(To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, party

must. . . bring the issue to the attention of the trial court, thus
providing the court an opportunity to rule on the issue's merits.)
POINT II
WHETHER THE MOWER/LYNN FORM AGREEMENT
IS A COMPLETE INTEGRATED CONTRACT PRESENTS
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT REQUIRING
A REVERSAL OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
A.

Appellees f Briefs:
Lynn

Transportation,

in

its

brief,

argues

that

the

following clause: "This agreement constitutes the entire agreement

and understanding between the parties. . . " i s conclusive proof
that

parties1

the

written

agreement,

absent

the

insurance

application, was an integrated contract. Lynn also pleads that "to
rely on conduct extrinsic to the contract's clear written terms to
impose a contract duty upon Lynn is to ignore the express terms of
the parties 1 contract as well as Mower's repeated admission of that
contractual

duty

[to obtain worker's compensation

insurance]."

(Lynn's brief, p. 12).
B.

Discussion:
Lynn's argument that the form contract is an integrated

contract because the contract says so, is not dispositive.

As set

forth on p. 2 0 of Mower's opening brief, whether the parties adopt
a writing or writings as the final and complete expression of their
bargain is a question of fact.
(not

just

question.

the

integration

Moreover, parol evidence is used

clause)

to

resolve

the

integration

E.g. Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P. 2d 663, 665 (Utah

1985) .
In contesting summary judgment, Mower showed by attached
affidavits that at the time he signed the Mower/Lynn form contract,
he also signed the insurance order form provided by Lynn and A&A.
He was also told that Lynn would deduct insurance premium money
from checks paid to Mower, which Lynn did.
Mower

believed

that

he had

complied
8

with

From the foregoing,
his

duty

under

the

contract by ordering insurance through Lynn and A&A.

Further, by

supplemented affidavit of Jerry Anderegg1, Mower showed that Lynn
and A&A had an obligation to purchase the insurance ordered by
Mower or to notify him that the insurance was unavailable (R. 536,
491 at f 6 , 7 ) . By supplemented affidavit of Anderegg, Mower also
showed that his belief that he had worker's compensation insurance
was reasonable.

(R. 536, 491 at 5 9) .

Moreover, in appellee's

Memoranda in Support of the Summary Judgment, Lynn and A&A each
admitted that Lynn provided the A&A insurance order form to Mower
contemporaneously with the Mower/Lynn form agreement.

They also

admit that Lynn told Mower that Lynn would order the insurance from
A&A and compute Mower's premiums.

(R. 398-401).

The foregoing is

sufficient evidence to show that the Mower/Lynn form contract was
not a complete

integrated

contract.

Instead, the two related

agreements should have been construed together.

C. f. Bullfrog

Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P.2d 266 (Utah 1972) (trial court did
not

err

in

following

the

rule of

1

law that when

two

or more

At page 7 and f.n. 2 of its brief, Lynn notes the court
granted its Motion to Strike the "Anderegg Affidavit" and claims
this was not appealed. The Order granting summary judgment which
is on appeal here also granted the Motion to Strike so that issue
is in fact on appeal. However, the supplemental affidavit of Jerry
Anderegg was filed after the Motion to Strike and was never subject
to the motion.
It should be noted the supplemental affidavit
corrected the deficiencies claimed to exist in the motions which
were subject to the Motion to Strike. The supplemental affidavit,
after setting out proper foundation related all opinions given in
the previous affidavits. See R. 536-540.
9

instruments are executed by the same parties contemporaneously, or
at different times in the course of the same transaction, and
concern the same subject matter, they will be read and construed
together. . . although they do not in terms refer to each other).
POINT III
WHETHER MOWER REASONABLY RELIED
ON LYNN'S MISREPRESENTATIONS AND WHETHER
THE PROMISES MADE BY LYNN WERE SUFFICIENTLY DEFINITE
ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT REQUIRING
A REVERSAL OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
A.

Appellees f Briefs:
In its brief, Lynn says that as a matter of law, Mower

couldn't have relied on its employees1 misrepresentations because
"Mower does not testify that Granath [Lynn's employee] ever said
she would

obtain

such

[worker's

compensation]

insurance; that

Granath never committed to do anything more than faxing the form
with his [Mower's] 'X' on it". Further, Lynn says that Mower never
received a rider or any other indication that his insurance was in
effect, and he never saw a calculation of premium."
that,

Mower

contract".2

cannot

rely

on a

statement

(Lynn's brief, pp. 16-21).

2

contrary

Lynn also says
to

the

form

Finally, Lynn says its

There is not in fact any "contrary statement" to the form
contract. The contract merely required Mower to obtain insurance.
Mower, in good faith, tried to do so in the manner suggested by
Lynn itself. See opening Brief at pp. 6-11. Nothing in or about
the contract touches in any way on the manner in which insurance
was to be obtained. Since the contract did not control the method
of obtaining insurance, it is not contrary to the terms of the
10

employees1 promises were indefinite so Mower could not possibly
have relied on them.

(Lynn's brief, p. 24). This is a claim for

the jury to decide.

Lynn also argues that Mower was not without

fault.
B.

This is another factual issue.

Discussion:
The

first

problem

with

Lynn's

argument

is that

the

question of reasonable reliance is a factual issue to be resolved
by the jury.

C.f. Rothey v. Walker Bank & Trust Company, 754 P.2d

1222 (Utah 1988).
matter

of

law

Reliance is a fact issue.

issue".

Lynn does an

It is not an "as a

excellent

job

in taking

snippets from the record to support its no reasonable reliance
argument.

However, it omits an abundance of evidence showing that

Lynn's representations
relied on them.
1.
directed

and

the Mower

reasonably

A brief summary of such evidence follows:
After presenting Mower with the form contract, Lynn

him

insurance.

were definite

to Linda Murray

(Granath)

to discuss

and

obtain

(R. 398, 427, 466.).
2.

Lynn's employees specifically told Mower that Lynn

could order worker's compensation insurance cheaper than he could
get it himself and money would be withheld from his checks to pay
for the insurance.

R. 427, 466, 486-89 (Mower Affidavit).

contract to claim Lynn agreed to effect the insurance through A&A
on Mower's behalf.
11

3.

Mower was a former Lynn employee, knew Linda, and

knew that Linda's job was to obtain insurance for Lynn's employees.
4.

Linda presented A&A's order form to Mower and told

him that Lynn would compute the premiums for whatever insurance he
ordered and would deduct them from Mower's checks. Lynn did deduct
insurance premiums from Mower's checks.
5.
liability
Bobtail

Mower requested worker's compensation, bobtail and

insurance
and

R. 486-89.

by

using

liability

the

A&A

insurance

form

were

compensation insurance was not obtained.
6.

supplied

by

obtained,

Lynn.

worker's

R. 477.

Neither Lynn nor A&A ever told Mower that they had

not obtained worker's compensation coverage for Mower along with
his other insurance.
7.
foregoing

An

R. 173, 175, 178, 466.

expert

circumstances,

witness
Mower's

testified,
belief

compensation insurance was reasonable.

that

that
he

under

had

the

worker's

R. 490-93.

All of the above, though briefly summarized, shows that
whether Mower reasonably relied on Lynn's misrepresentations is a
fact issue requiring a reversal of the summary judgment.
A second problem with Lynn's argument is that contrary to
the unsupported assertions in their brief, the statements made by
Lynn's

employees

agreement.

were

not

See f .n. 1, supra.

contrary

to

the

form

Mower/Lynn

The form contract requires Mower to
12

obtain worker's compensation insurance but it does not specify how
such coverage was to be obtained.

Lynn told Mower that coverage

could be obtained through A&A with payment to be made by deductions
by Lynn from Mower's checks.

Such deductions were, in fact, made.

That representation does not directly or indirectly contradict the
Mower/Lynn form agreement.
by Mower.

In fact, it shows attempted compliance

It simply provides one way that Mower could obtain

worker's compensation insurance to satisfy his contract with Lynn.
POINT IV
THE FORM MOWER/LYNN CONTRACT DOES
NOT PRECLUDE MOWER FROM SUING LYNN FOR
NEGLIGENCE, NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
AND FRAUD.
A.

Appellees' Briefs:
Lynn

says that because the contract

executed

by and

between Mower and Lynn defines the duty regarding the acquisition
of Worker's

Compensation

insurance, Mower's

action may only sound in contract.

alleged

causes

(Lynn's brief at 25).

of

Lynn

also says that since Mower's claim is for purely economic loss,
only such losses are recoverable under a contract claim.

(Lynn's

brief, pp. 27, 28 and f.n. 9 ) .
B.

Discussion.
Lynn and A&A's liability to Mower springs from three

13

sources:
(2)

(1) Lynn's oral or contract promise to obtain insurance3;

Lynn's

misrepresentation

that

Lynn

could

obtain

worker's

compensation insurance from A&A; and, (3) A&A and Lynn's negligent
performance of the insurance broker duties4.

Thus, when Lynn and

A&A failed to obtain the worker's compensation insurance or notify
Mower that coverage was not available, they became subject to suit
under theories of breach of contract, negligence and fraud.

E.g.

Precision Castparts Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins of Oregon, Inc., 607
P.2d 763 (Or. App. 1980) (breach of contract, negligence); Magic
Valley

Potato

Shippers v. Continental

Insurance, 739

P.2d

372

(Idaho 1987) (fraud); Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc. v. Pete's Satire,
Inc., 739 P.2d

239

(Colo. 1987)

(negligence); Clary

Insurance

Agency v. Doyle, 620 P.2d 194 (Alaska 1980) (negligence).

C.f.

Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-102(2) (binding oral contracts may be made
as

to

worker's

compensation

insurance) ;

§31A-23-302(1) (a) (i)

(unfair marketing practice to make any communication which contains
3

As set forth in Point VII of this Brief, A&A is vicariously
liable for Lynn's promises and misrepresentations. An oral promise
to procure insurance is enforceable. C.f. Utah Code Ann. §31A-21102(2) (buying oral contracts of insurance may. . . be made. . .as
to worker's compensation insurance. . . . ) .
4

An insurance broker is a person or entity who acts in
procuring insurance on behalf of the applicant.
Utah Code Ann.
§§31A-1-301(43) ; 31A-23-102(1) (b) (whether a person or entity acts
as an agent for the applicant is a question of fact precluding
summary judgment) Van Per Heyde v. First Colony Life Insurance
Company, 845 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1993); Vina v. Jefferson Insurance
Company of New York, 761 P.2d 581, 585 (Utah App. 1988) •
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false or misleading information relating to an insurance contract
including information which is false or misleading because it is
incomplete).
POINT V
SIMPLY BECAUSE A&A DID NOT SIGN THE MOWER/LYNN
FORM AGREEMENT, DOES NOT BAR MOWER'S
CONTRACT AND TORT CLAIMS AGAINST A&A.
A.

A&A f s Brief:
A&A says that since Mower admits that A&A was not a party

to the Mower/Lynn form agreement, Lynn was not acting as A&A's
agent so Mower can't sue A&A for breach of contract or for any
misrepresentations made to Lynn.
that Lynn

is not an

A&A also said it is undisputed

insurance agent or broker

vicarious liability for Lynn's misrepresentations.

so A&A has no
(A&A's Brief,

pp. 9-10, 16-20).
B.

Discussion:
Lynn was A&A's agent or at least a jury could conclude

that Lynn was A&A's agent.
one who acts for another.

See Opening Brief pp, 6-9.

There is ample evidence that Lynn acted

for A&A to solicit insurance orders.
Appellant's Opening Brief.

An agent is

See generally pp 6-9 of

For example, Lynn told Mower it would

obtain insurance for him through A&A (R. 427, 466). The order form
given to Mower was prepared by A&A (R. 396, 418, 477).

A&A is a

broker (R. 297-98, 318, 337). A&A has no Utah office but provides
15

order forms to Lynn (R. 178, 183, 299, 336, 467-68).

From the

above, a jury could conclude that Lynn was A&A's agent.

Thus,

A&A's claim that it should not be vicariously liable, does not
justify the lower court's summary judgment.
POINT VI
UTAH CODE ANN. S31A-1-43f3)fa) DOES
NOT BAR MOWERS CLAIMS AGAINST
LYNN TRANSPORTATION AND A&A.
A.

Appellees' Briefs:
Lynn

says that

even

if it had

obtained

the

ordered

worker's compensation insurance, that Mower would not have received
benefits because Mower did not notify the Industrial Commission as
set forth in Utah

Code Ann.

§31A-l-43(3)(a).

In effect, Lynn says

that Mower was not damaged by Lynn's misconduct but by Mower's
failure in filing the notice.
B.

Discussion:
Neither Lynn Transportation nor A&A cite any case law for

their unsupported notion that notice provisions like Utah Code Ann.
§31-1-43(a) bar claims for worker's compensation coverage.
the opposite is true.

Just

In the only reported case, the parties have

discovered, Garrett v. Garrett, 249 S.E.2d 808 (N.C. App. 1978),
the court held that the insurance carrier was estopped from using
a

similar

statute

as

compensation coverage.

a

defence

to

a

demand

for

worker's

If Lynn and A&A are estopped from using
16

Utah

Code

Ann.

§31-1-43 (3) (a) , then

their

failure

to

obtain

coverage results in damage.
The supplemental affidavit of Jerry Anderegg (R. 536-540)
explains

that

compliance

with

§31A-l-43(3)(a)

is

normally

undertaken by the agent (A&A) on behalf of the client.

Anderegg

further testified the agent or broker

(Lynn/A&A) has a duty to

inform the client about the requirements of §31A-l-43(3)(a) and
failure to do so breaches their duty to the client.

Id.

POINT VII
WHETHER PLAINTIFF FAILED TO SHOW EVIDENCE
OF BREACH OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR MISREPRESENTATION
BY A&A WAS NOT AT ISSUE IN THE LOWER COURT.
MOREOVER, THERE IS EVIDENCE OF BREACH
OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE AND MISREPRESENTATION.
A.

A&A f s Brief:
In its brief, A&A argues that plaintiff failed to show

material

evidence of breach of contract, negligence, fraud or

misrepresentation by A&A in the lower court (A&A Brief at 10-14).
B.

Discussion:
A&A has apparently misapprehended Mower's argument on the

parol evidence rule.

In a nutshell, plaintiff asserts that since

A&A was not a party to the driving contract between Lynn and Mower,
it cannot avail itself of legal rules related to an integrated
contract to avoid liability for its own acts of breach of contract,
negligence, fraud or misrepresentation.
17

See Opening Brief at 24-

27.
Taken in the light most favorable to Mower rwinegar v.
Froerer Corp. , 813 P. 2d 104 (Utah 1991)].

The facts set out in

Appellants' Opening Brief show:
1.

Mower was required to obtain worker's compensation

insurance R. 172, 181.
2.

Mower was given an A&A form by Lynn and told Lynn

would get insurance for him through A&A and would deduct premiums
from his settlement check.
3.

Mower used

R. 396, 418, 427, 466, 477.
the A&A

form to order

insurance

checked the box to order worker's compensation insurance.

and

R. 477,

486-87; Kirk Mower Depo. p. 113.
4.

Mower was justified in believing he had obtained

insurance from A&A.

See Anderegg Affidavit f 9, R. 483-84.

A&A argues there was no mutual assent.

Yet a jury could

easily find the A&A form to be an offer to procure the listed
coverages which was accepted by Mower when he checked the boxes and
caused the form to be delivered to A&A.

In fact, the procuring by

A&A of bobtail and liability coverage pursuant to the order form
creates a past performance which in itself shows mutual assent to
the

contract.

coverages

listed

The
on

fact
its

that

A&A

order

provided

form,

and

two

of

collected

the

three

premiums

therefore, without obtaining worker's compensation insurance or
18

informing Mower it was not doing so, creates evidence of a failure
by A&A to do its duty to provide insurance to Mower.
Affidavits at R. 483, 536.
recovery.

See Anderegg

Such conduct provides a clear basis for

E.g. Fiorentino v. Travelers Insurance Company, 448 F.

Supp. 1364 (E.D. Pa. 1978); State Farm Insurance Company v. Fort
Wayne

National

Bank,

474

N.E.2d

524

(Ind. App.

1985);

Clary

Insurance Agency v. Doyle, 620 P.2d 194 (Alaska 1980).
POINT VIII
THE INDEMNIFICATION CLAUSE CANNOT BE APPLIED
TO MOWER'S CLAIMS BECAUSE THE CLAIMS DO NOT RESULT
FROM THE PERFORMANCE OF THE FORM AGREEMENT.
A.

Lynn's Brief:
In its brief, Lynn argues that Mower's claim results from

the performance of the form agreement because "it is undisputed
that

Mower's

agreement."
agreement

injury

occurred

while

he

was

performing

this

It also says that it is clear from the parties form
that

the

parties

intended

Mower

to

assume

the

responsibility of complying with the Worker's Compensation law so
the indemnification clause must apply.
B.

(Lynn's brief at 35).

Discussion:
Mower's injuries, for which damages are sought herein,

occurred because worker's compensation insurance was not in force
at the time of his accident.

Had there been an extant worker's

compensation policy, Mower would have no claimed injuries.
19

Mower's injuries thus occurred as a result of the failure
of

Lynn

and

A&A

contemporaneous

to

perform

agreement.

That

a

separate,
the

though

agreement

arose

related,
from

an

attempt by Mower to comply with his duty under the Lynn agreement
to obtain insurance should not and in fact does not implicate that
agreement which contains the indemnification.
POINT IX
A&A IS VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR
LYNN'S MISREPRESENTATION.
A.

A&A's Brief:
A&A claims it is not liable to Mower because A&A was not

a signatory to the Mower/Lynn form contract. A&A's Brief at 11-14.
A&A also says it had no communication with Mower so it cannot be
found liable for fraud or misrepresentation.

A&A's Brief pp. 16-

22.
B.

Discussion:
A&A's liability to Mower does not depend on whether A&A

was a signatory to the Mower/Lynn form contract.

Rather, A&A's

liability springs from its action as an insurance broker.
an insurance broker.

(R. 297-98, 318, 337).

A&A is

An insurance broker

is an entity or person who acts in procuring insurance on behalf of
an applicant.

Utah Code Ann. §§31A-1-301(43); §31A-23-102(1)(b).

However, A&A did not maintain an office in Utah.

Instead, it did

business by providing to Lynn Transportation insurance order forms
20

to be used by Lynn's truck drivers to order insurance (R. 178, 183,
299,336,467-68).

Lynn would process the forms for A&A and Lynn's

truck drivers. The form supplied to Mower with check-off spaces to
order worker's compensation coverage is a representation (written)
that

(1)

A&A

sells

worker's

compensation

insurance;

and

(2)

worker's compensation insurance can be obtained by checking the
appropriate box on the form.

From the foregoing, a jury could

easily conclude that Lynn was an agent of A&A and that A&A and Lynn
acted as an insurance broker for Mower.
made by A&A.

Misrepresentations were

The issue of whether an agent is an agent of the

applicant or the insured, is a question of fact, precluding summary
judgment.

See Van

Per

Hevde

v.

First

Colony

Life

Insurance

Company, 845 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1993) ; Vina v. Jefferson Insurance
Company of New York, 761 P.2d 581, 585 (Utah App. 1988).
Essentially, if the jury finds that Lynn and A&A acted as
an insurance broker for Mower, the jury can hold Lynn and A&A
liable for failure to obtain insurance or to notify Mower that
insurance was not available under theories of breach of contract,
negligence and/or fraud.
V.
CONCLUSION
Appellant's opening brief identified numerous issues of
material fact requiring reversal of the two summary judgments.
21

Further, none of the reasons advanced by Lynn Transportation and
Alexander & Alexander justify the lower court's summary judgments.
For these reasons, the summary judgments should be vacated and the
case remanded to the trial court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of August, 1995.
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EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KIRK H. MOWER,

]
• AFFIDAVIT OF JERRY ANDEREGG
Plaintiff,

vs.
ALEXANDER & ALEXANDER, INC., an
Oklahoma corporation qualified
to do business in the State of
Utah and LYNN TRANSPORTATION
COMPANY, INC., an Iowa corporation,
Defendant.

]
]
;
]i Civil No. 910905824CV
]
]
i Judge Moffat
]

STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Jerry Anderegg, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I am a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah and over

the age of 21 years.
2.

I am currently licensed by the State of Utah as a

registered insurance agent and broker.
3.

I have been an insurance agent for 18 years.

4.

I have been an insurance broker for 10 years.

5.

I have reviewed the form attached hereto as Ex. A.

6.

In my opinion as a licensed insurance broker and

agent, an insurance broker who received Exhibit A from a potential
client would have an obligation to purchase all of the requested
coverages including worker's compensation coverage for that client.
7.

In the event a requested form of coverage such as

worker's compensation was not available, a broker or agent would,
in my opinion as a licensed agent and broker, have a duty to inform
the client in writing that such coverage was not available and had
not been purchased.
8.

In my opinion as a licensed insurance agent and

broker, if any insurance agent or broker accepted money to purchase
insurance from a client who had used Exhibit A to order the
insurance, such agent and/or broker would have a duty to provide
worker's compensation insurance to the client or in the alternative
to

inform

the

client

in writing

that worker's

compensation

insurance had not been purchased.
9.

In my opinion, if Kirk Mower delivered the form

attached hereto as Exhibit A. to his employer for the purpose of
ordering insurance and money was withheld from his pay to pay for
insurance, Kirk Mower would be justified in believing he had
purchased worker's compensation insurance.
DATED this

/ r?\ day of January, 1992.

SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED TO before me this

7^

/^j

day of

, 1992.

Notary Pubfic
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January 24,1903
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State of Uth
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My Commission Expires:
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PUBLIC

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF JERRY ANDEREGG (Mower v. Alexander) was
mailed, postage prepaid, this

day of January, 1992 to the

following:
George Pratt
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH
170 South Main, #1500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Terry Plant
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970

5278-019\jn
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EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KIRK H. MOWER,

;
1
I

Plaintiff,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF JERRY
ANDEREGG

]

ALEXANDER & ALEXANDER, INC., an
Oklahoma corporation qualified
to do business in the State of
Utah and LYNN TRANSPORTATION
COMPANY, INC., an Iowa corporation,
Defendant.

]
]
]
]i
;
]
)
]

Civil No. 910905824CV
Judge Moffat

STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Jerry Anderegg, being first duly sworn deposes and says:
1.

I am a licensed insurance agent and broker.

My

qualifications are set forth in my previous affidavit dated January
13, 1992 filed in this action.
2.
upon

personal

opinions:

I have reviewed the issues in this matter and based
knowledge

and

experience

render

the

following

a)

Mr, Mower acted reasonably in assuming he had

purchased Worker's Compensation insurance which would cover him for
on the job injuries.
b)

Providing a form such as Exhibit A attached

hereto to a layman which form provides a space to order Worker's
Compensation coverage would, in my opinion, create in the layman a
reasonable

belief

that

if

he

checked

the

box

for

Worker's

Compensation coverage, he had ordered such coverage and Worker's
Compensation insurance would be provided unless he was expressly
informed after submission of the order form that such coverage was
not being provided.
c)

In my experience sole proprietors often include

themselves under Worker's Compensation policies.

It is my opinion

that it is the duty of the insurance agent to inform the insurance
carrier that the owner is to be insured as a worker.
d)

In my opinion it is the duty of the insurance

agent to obtain from the customer all information necessary to
effect the desired coverages.

In my opinion, failure of a customer

to volunteer information would not be a proper basis to support a
claim that coverage was not provided due to a lack of sufficient
information to effect the coverage.
e)

Mr. Mower acted reasonably in assuming he had

purchased Worker's Compensation coverage.

2

f)
Mower

was

Under the facts of this case, I believe Mr.

justified

in

believing

he

had

purchased

Worker's

Compensation coverage.
g)

In my opinion, it is the duty of the insurance

agent to inform the customer of all steps which must be taken to
effect coverage.
h)

In my opinion, if the insurance agent fails to

provide information to a customer which is necessary to effect
coverage, the agent is responsible for any failure of coverage.
3.

In my opinion, the responsibility for failure to

order and effect Worker's Compensation coverage for Mr. Mower in
this case rests with Lynn Transportation Company and Alexander and
Alexander.
DATED this

day of November, 1992.
rf

/JERRY & N D E R E G G T 7 7 j
SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED TCVbefore me this
November, 1992.

5~~

day of

NOTARY PUBLIC

RESIDING IN: ->• ^'
My Commission Expires:

r
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing AFFICAVIT OF JERRY ANDEREGG

(Mower v. Alexander) was

mailed, postage prepaid, this

day of November, 1992 to

f/^

the following:
Andrew H. Stone
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH
170 South Main, #1500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Terry Plant
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970
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EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KIRK H. MOWER,

]
AFFIDAVIT OF KIRK MOWER
Plaintiff,

vs.

;
]

ALEXANDER & ALEXANDER, INC., an ]
Oklahoma corporation qualified ;
to do business in the State of
Utah and LYNN TRANSPORTATION
I
COMPANY, INC., an Iowa corporation,
)
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

Civil No. 910905824CV
Judge Moffat

)

) ss:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Kirk H. Mower, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I am the plaintiff in the above named action.

2.

On April 12, 1990, I entered into a contract with

Lynn Transportation Co., Inc. to lease my truck to them and to then
drive the truck to transport goods for Lynn Transportation in
interstate commerce.

3.

I was provided a form (Exhibit A) by Lynn Trans-

portation to order insurance.

I filled out the form and indicated

I wished to purchase worker's compensation insurance.
4.

I was told money to pay for the insurance would be

withheld from my settlement checks.
5.
for

f!

Money was withheld from my settlement checks to pay

insurance. "
6.

I beleived I had purchased worker's compensation

7.

I would not have operated the truck if I have known

insurance.

there was no worker's compensation insurance in force.
8.

I understood Lynn Transportation was acting for

Alexander & Alexander to help me order insurance.
9.

I was injured on the job on July 28, 1990. My lower

back was seriously injured.
10.

My doctor has told me I need

a spinal fusion

operation and will always be disabled to some degree.
11.

I do not have money to pay my attorney's costs to go

out of state for depositions.
12.

All transactions with the defendnats in this case

occured in Salt Lake County, Utah.
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DATED thiis

3

day of X^ecci*. *es

By: M^J

, 1991.

//

/yfq^^C

KIRK H. MOWER
SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED TO before me this
rs->7 Otr

^

day of

1991.

^

Zz^-f

NOTARY PySLIC
RESIDING IN :
My Commission Expires:

2S0NOrtTKV.,^LL«
SIC, UT E413
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF KIRK MOWER (Mower v. Alexander) was hand
delivered, this

-£

day of

following:
George Pratt
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH
170 South Main, #1500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Terry Plant
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970

5278-006\jn
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